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HISTORY  
Of the Management  
OF THE  
WAR;  
IN A  
LETTER  
TO A  
*Tory-Member.*

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*The Fourth Edition.*

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LONDON:

Printed for *A. Baldwin* and *M. G.*  
at *Essex-street-Gate*, 1711.

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THE  
HISTORY

OF THE

WAR

LETTER

TO THE

MEMBERS

LONDON:

Printed by A. Hall, and W. G.

at the Old Bailey

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November 23d. 1710.

S I R,

**A**S little as I love Scandal, whatever side it comes from, I have prevail'd with my self, in Obedience to your Commands, to run over the bundle you sent me; and knowing You to be a person of that Integrity and Honour, as to have more regard to Truth than Party, I will without more Ceremony give you my Thoughts as you desire, upon such Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will find not to be the less true or just for the Haste they are writ in; for plain Truths need no Disguise; Fiction and Ornament are of no advantage, but when they serve a Cause that can't bear to be seen in its true Light. This I hope will be excuse enough for the many Marks of Haste and Negligence you will meet with in this long Letter.

You won't expect I should consider each of these Papers by themselves, that would be giving too much trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of so much consequence; *The Letter to the Examiner* is a mere Declamation, and consider'd in that view is a pretty smart Performance, and you may read it to be entertain'd, but not to be inform'd; there is some Fire and Imagination, but no Reasoning, Judgment or Experience, plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in time ripen into something considerable, and come up to the *Author of Artus and Odolphus*, which is the Fiction of a more able Writer, and has the beauties of

a tolerable Romance : And to shew the Skill of the *Au-  
thor*, is very happily call'd a *Secret History*; which is a  
Cover for all the Lies the Father of them can invent,  
since that Name immediately forbids all asking of Que-  
stions ; for were the Proofs to be produc'd, where would  
be the Secret ? I can't say . I was so well pleas'd with  
Sir *Thomas*, which I found so dull and tedious, 'twas im-  
possible to get thro' it : There is, by all I could see, nei-  
ther Decorum nor Argument, nor Life in it ; the *Au-  
thor* shews he was sadly put to it for Matter, when he is for-  
ced, to make up his Investive, to take in the Compass  
of 22 Years, the fatal Period some among us are so  
angry with, that is 18 more, than the present Change  
is concern'd in ; for 'tis but four Years at most, that his  
Principals pretend to think (for think they don't, as I  
shall shew you by and by) that the Management of Af-  
fairs has been wrong. In short, 'tis a stupid unnatu-  
ral Piece, and what made me more sick of it, I have  
been told, 'tis as ungrateful as 'tis senseless, writ by a  
Man, who owes his bread to those, whom he has with so  
much Venome drawn his Pen against. I don't know  
whether you will agree with me, when I tell you ; I  
think the *Letter from a Foreign Minister* the most artful  
Performance of them all ; the rest seem to be the Works  
of under Agents, from Directions and Hints mark'd out  
for them : But this I take to be the Work of the chief  
Operator himself ; who, if he was not at leisure to  
write more largely, has in this short Piece sufficiently  
shewn, what a right he has to the Esteem the World  
have long had for him ; there being in it some quick  
and crafty Turns, and an affected appearance of Fair-  
ness, with which he gilds over the blackest Poison of  
Malice and *Invention*. You'll see I use that last word in  
the modern Sense of it ; and in my Mind the whole Let-  
ter is well enough contriv'd, to answer its design ; which  
plainly is, to please Friends, take off Enemies, amuse  
and quiet all, who are not acquainted with affairs, nor  
enter into Parties, but by the new *Scheme* might be apt  
to be alarm'd. *Faults on Both Sides* has, to my thinking,

a good deal of plain common Sense in it, which experience has all along justify'd, and I dare say always will. And common sense at this time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to a Paper, and that this Writer seldom loses sight of, except where his Cause obliges him to quit it; which it does in several places, but no where more than where he speaks of Credits, all which is as mean, as the late *Essay* upon that Subject; and that I take to be the most affected uncommon mysterious Piece of Nonsense, even this wonderful Year has produc'd.

Taking these Papers together, there is one thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Architect, under whom they have all been form'd; and that is the Difference of Spirit one sees in them, according to the several Sorts of Readers they are intended to impose on. One makes great Court to the *Tories*, another is to gain the *Whigs*, or divide them at least, others pretend mightily to Moderation; to catch the Men that have Honesty and Temper, and have not engag'd far in either Party, others seem chiefly design'd to impole on Foreigners, and make them believe, all we have been doing these six Months, is only a personal Business, that can have no influence on the publick; that therefore the Allies, particularly the *Dutch*, and the House of *Mannover*, should not be alarmed to see those Men disgrac'd, who, whatever other Faults they may have, never lay under the suspicion of favouring Popery and *France*; but have been ever true to the Revolution: have always gone into Measures for a vigorous Prosecution of the War, and have constantly been struggling to gain new Securities for the Defence of the Protestant Succession.

The various Shapes of this Posture-Master in Politics, make this bundle of Papers, methinks, if you will pardon the Comparison, not much unlike a Pedler's Rare-Show, in which there is a great Number of very different Figures, all in Motion at once; which the gaping Spectators think there is some strange Magick in, and that the Spring of action is in themselves; when in Truth

Truth they are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, mov'd all by one and the same secret Hand, and all contriv'd for the same End, to delude and cheat the Multitude. And what is still more surprizing, this great Master himself has in his own Person acted, and that at the same time, all the different Parts, which his Tools in their Writings have but copy'd from him. But whatever various Figures these Engines of his affect to move in, and whatever different ways they take, they all make to the same End, and agree in those parts, of which you desire my Opinion, I mean in censuring the Management of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the Reputation of those, who have been hitherto the chief Directors of it. Upon which Head all they say, may be reduced to these four Points.

1<sup>st</sup>. That a good Peace might have been had at the end of the *Ramellis* Campaign.

2<sup>dly</sup>. That the War in *Spain* has been shamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entering into the War.

3<sup>dly</sup>. That pushing the War in *Flanders* was pushing it in the wrong place, *France* being covered on that side with so strong a Frontier.

4<sup>thly</sup>. That it is many ways apparent, that the Duke of *Marleborough* has unnecessarily prolong'd the War for his own Interest.

Now if it can be shewn, that these terrible Accusations are not only false in themselves, but certainly known to be so by the Authors of them, I leave it to you, to consider, what Regard ought to be had to such Men, or what Treatment they deserve, who have so grossly imposed upon the Nation, to the apparent Hazard of its Safety, and of losing all the Fruits we might hope for, from a War, that has been hitherto conducted with so much Glory and Success.

To clear these great Points, we are desir'd, it seems, to go no farther back than the four last Years at most; in truth 'tis not much above three that there is any Dispute about: Till then, all is allow'd to have gone well for

for certain Reasons, that held good, till about the time that the *French* King dismiss'd Monsieur *Chamillard* from the *Finances*, for no other Reason, that I have ever heard, but to shew us what we ought to have done here at the same time; and 'twas not the Fault of those who have play'd their Game better since, that we did not. This was in *February*, 1707||8, all the Complaisants we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the beginning of that Year, but without much Noise till these last six Months. Since then we have been told, every thing relating to the War is wrong, and are fill'd with loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went abroad in gentle Whispers only, or were not at all heard of. And——

*First*, They tell us, a Good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramellies* Campaign.

Now to decide this Question, we must first settle what a Good Peace is; and in order to that must consider, what it was we went into the War for. No body wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain these two Ends, the *Restitution* of the *Spanish* Monarchy to the House of *Austria*, and the procuring of a good Barrier against *France* on the side of the *Netherlands*. Without which two points there can be no Security for *Great-Britain*, that their best Trade will not be lost, and with it their Religion and Government, and every thing that is dear to them, for we should every Minute be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery and Poverty of *France* forc'd upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that most arbitrary Prince, if he should be suffer'd to strengthen himself with the Addition of that vast Monarchy, who was before much too great for his Neighbours; to say nothing of the Safety of the Dutch, or the Liberty of *Europe*; the last of which most of us, I fear, have little or no sense of; and for the Safety of the *Dutch*, so fatal a Delusion has possess'd many of us, that one may every day meet with Men, who are silly enough to wish against it. Now the *Spanish* Monarchy, the *Restitution* of which is the first Article of the Grand Alliance, is

known

known by every body to consist, besides the *Spanish Netherlands* of these two great Parts, of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and of *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the adjacent *Isles*. And a good Barrier against *France* means at least a better than the *Dutch* had before; which by the Experience of fifty Years has been found to be much too weak for so large a Frontier; the *Spanish Flanders* and its Capital City *Gand*, having in truth no Cover at all; and *Brabant* but a very poor one; while the *French* being intire Masters of the *Lys* and *Scheldt*, both Provinces lie expos'd to their Invasions. Look but on some large Maps of these Provinces, such as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will presently convince you of the Truth of this. But if this Restitution and this Barrier were thought necessary at our ent'ring into the War, no body, I presume, will say they are less necessary now, when so much more has been done to gain these Ends, than any body at the Beginning could ever hope to see. And if these two points are necessary, then no Peace without them can be a good Peace. Let us then compare this good Peace with what the *French* offer'd at the end of the *Ramillies* Campaign, which is so far from being a Secret, that the Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was employ'd by the King of *France* to make the first Overture, were immediately communicated to all the Allies, and by their Consent made publick: And who-ever will be at the pains to look back to the News papers, and Monthly Accounts of that time, or will consult even the common Yearly Collections, will see there is no Mystery in the Whole of that affair; which, in short, is no more than this, that the *French* offer'd to give up to the Allies, which of these two they lik'd best, either *Spain* and the *Indies*; or *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily* &c. Which Offer was unanimously rejected.

I suppose, there is no need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either part of this Alternative, it being so thort of what upon our Ent'rance into the War was thought necessary. To have been con-

tent with a Moiety of what we went into the War for;  
 after so many Successes, and not a few surprizingly great,  
 would have rend'ed us inexcusable to all posterity; and  
 some body, who, we were now told, prolongs the War,  
 would have been said to have been well paid for such  
 a Peace; 'twould have been in the Language of the Fac-  
 tion, a plain Case, we are sold to *France*, and nothing  
 less than his Head could have atton'd for it. But in-  
 stead of proving the absurdity of accepting such a Peace,  
 I shall shew you rather, what to every body is not so  
 plain; and that is, that the French were not sincere;  
 they meant nothing by their Offer but to amuse the Al-  
 lies, and knew, they could not all agree to accept ei-  
 ther part of the Alternative, and that *England* and *Hol-*  
*land* without the Emperor could not take *Spain* and the  
*Indies*, were they never so much inclin'd to it. For had  
 the Allies hearken'd to this proposal, it had been in  
 the power of the French to have clos'd with which they  
 wou'd. Now 'tis easy to see what this must have ended  
 in: For in such a Partition, there is no doubt, but as  
 the *Dutch* and we should have been for *Spain* and the  
*Indies*, the Emperor would have made the other part his  
 Choice, which is evidently best for him. Which part  
 now of the Allies in this Division would *France* be most  
 willing to comply with? or in other Words, which part  
 of the Monarchy would they chuse of the two to quit?  
 A Man must be blind not to see, that the part the Em-  
 peror would like best to have, the same *France* would  
 like best to part with: Behold then the necessary Con-  
 sequence of heark'ning to such Terms; the Confederacy  
 broken, and the Maritime powers left to shift for them-  
 selves, without being able to obtain either of the parts,  
 when they ought to be content, according to the Terms  
 of the Grand Alliance, with nothing less than both.

Who now, I would fain know, have most Reason to  
 complain that these Offers were rejected, the people of  
*London* or *Vienna*? They who might have had the part  
 they had most mind to, if they would have abandon'd  
 their Allies, or we, who 'tis certain, besides the Infa-

my of so base an Action, could have had nothing? Had the Writers, who are so able at making Something out of Nothing, had their Lot in *Austrian* Grounds, what a Field had there been for them? What rare Matter to shew their Skill in? What specious pretences, without the help of *Secret History*, to give out, that the Emperor was ill advis'd? What! reject so advantageous an Offer, by which so great an addition of real Strength would have been made to the House of *Austria*, and that at a Time, when they were so unable to carry on the WAR when the P E O P L E have been exhausted with continual Wars for more than Thirty Years! when the *Malecontents* are at the Gates of the Capital! When the King of *Sweden* insults in that outrageous manner, the *Imperial* Dignity, and every Minute threatens an Invasion! Is that a Time to reject so good a Peace and hazard the Safety of the Empire in Complement to the Maritime Powers? What wicked Counsellors must these be, who can advise at this rate? Is it not plain they are false, and in some other Interest, or that they mind nothing else but making their own Fortunes, when they act so manifestly against the Welfare and Honour of the *Imperial* Family, and shew they have no Regard to the Safety even of the Empire? Would not this be the Language of the Faction, if the Scene were chang'd from *London* to *Vinna*? And yet we don't hear, that either the Emperor or his people, have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Ministers, who would not hearken to those Terms; instead of that, all the world think it much for their Honour, that they have appear'd true to themselves, and faithful to their Allies, in rejecting so pitiful and insecure a Peace.

And is not this a Reproach to us, who suffer our selves to be deluded by such vile Imposters, who would persuade us out of our senses, that half the *Spanish* Monarchy is as good as the whole, and that Nothing is as good as Half. For I have shewn you, that one Half only was offer'd,

offer'd, and that even that could not be had. It must  
 sure, to all Thinking Men, be very surprizing, that  
 we only of all the Allies shou'd complain that this ridi-  
 culous Offer of the *French* was rejected, when we of all  
 of them have most reason to be pleas'd with it: There  
 must needs be some Secret in it above the reach of  
 common Sense, that all of a sudden this shou'd be made  
 a Capital Crime in our Ministers, their not doing Three  
 Years ago that, which if they had done, we should all  
 before now have thought they deserv'd to lose their  
 Heads for.

I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Article, and  
 would be content I should say no more in so plain a  
 Case, after such a Discovery of the Impudence of  
 these State Mountebanks, who would have perswaded  
 us, that we were dangerously ill, when we saw and felt  
 our selves to be very well; and that we were all un-  
 done, if we did not leave the skilful and able Hands we  
 had long us'd with so much Success, to try their bo-  
 asted Medicines, when we were not in the least want of  
 them. No body, if you will believe them, have such u-  
 niversal Remedies for all the Evils of the State as they;  
 and under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation,  
 they take all the pains they can to poison it; of which  
 I have already given you one Example; you shall have  
 more in what follows.

But before I dismiss this Subject, I must beg leave to  
 observe one thing farther, which is of too much moment  
 to be past over; and that is, That they who have done  
 their Country so much Service in rejecting this Offer  
 from the *French*, would have done it still much greater,  
 could they have prevented any Regard being given to it.  
 For tho' the refusing these Terms could do no harm,  
 the hearkning to them I will shew you did a great deal.  
 The Inclination some people of the same Complexion  
 with the Author of the *Secret History*, express'd to come  
 to a Treaty with the *French* upon the Terms offer'd,  
 rais'd in the Imperial Court a great Jealousy, that the Ma-  
 licious Powers were tampering with *France*, and making  
 Terms

Terms for themselves, to which the Interest of the House of *Austria* was to be sacrific'd : This put that Court upon Measures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and occasion'd the two most unfortunate Events that have happen'd all this War. First, This Suspicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the *French* for evacuating the *Milanese*, without the privacy of *England* and *Holland*, who did not know one Word of the Matter. And what do you think was the Consequence of this? Why, it gave the *French* an Opportunity of sending immediately into *Spain* a great Body of good Veteran Troops; and 'tis to this Reinforcement sent the Duke of *Anjou*, that we owe the loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, which prov'd so fatal to our Affairs on that Side; if those Troops had not joyn'd, we had been Superior to the Enemy, and that Battle had either not been fought, or it had been won, and *Spain* with it, considering the ill Condition of the Duke of *Anjou's* Affairs were then in; and the true Reason we ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Junction, which we did not know, or at least did not believe, was made at the Time we fought; a mistake, we may think, very easily made in *Spain*, when 'tis known, we owe the Victory of *Ramellies* to the *French* making the very same Mistake in *Flanders*, where they thought the *English* had not at that time joyn'd the Confederate Army, and reckon'd for certain that the *Danes* at least, neither had, nor could: And this Perswasion made them venture a Battle, which the *French* have so much reason to remember, without waiting for a considerable Body of Troops, that were coming to them from the *Rhine*, the Head of which were actually at *Namur*, when *Monfieur Yulleroi* began his March towards the Confederates. But to return, 'tis plain the *French* had not gain'd the battle of *Almanza* without that Reinforcement from *Italy*, and even with it, tho' the battle was fought in *April* and our Army was in a manner ruin'd by that blow, all they did that Year, was only to take *Lerida*. But that Reinforcement could not have been sent, had not the

Secret Treaty for the Evacuation of the *Milanese* been made; and the Treaty had not been made, had not the Jealousy rais'd in the Imperial Court, by the Inclination some People, express'd to hearken to the Offer of the *French*, made them resolve upon securing something for themselves. And the same Jealousy put them upon taking another Step, no less prejudicial to the common Cause; and that was the Expedition to *Naples*, which they could not be prevail'd with to defer upon the repeated and most pressing Instances that the Maritime Powers made to them by their Ministers, both at *Vienna* and *Italy*. And the Consequence of the Expedition was, that it not only diverted a great part of the Troops, that were to execute the project on *Toulon*, but retarded for a considerable time the March of the rest; and this Loss of Time, & lessening of their Numbers, seem to have been the chief Occasions of the Miscarriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court so obstinately bent on that unhappy Expedition, but the fears they had, that *Naples* as well as *Milan*, would at the *Hague* be given up to facilitate a Peace, which they were resolv'd to prevent, by getting Possession as soon as they could. This is all we have got by heark'ning to those Offers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime we did not close with; the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Miscarriage of the Project on *Toulon*, the greatest, most important, best concerted Enterprize that was ever entred on. And both these Misfortunes had in all Probability been prevented, had the Offers of the *French* been roundly rejected at the first, and no Occasion of Jealousy had, by listning to them, been given the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which these Writers, or those at least that dictate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that Two and Two make Four; and if they have any Modesty, they will blush when you let them see their Inventions thus expos'd.

After saying so much of that Part of the Offer the *French* made, which concerns the Partition they propos'd of the

*Spanish*

*Spanish* Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted if we could, and could not if we would; there is no need of telling you, what *Barrier* was offer'd for the *Netherlands*, which the *Dutch* were most concern'd in, who don't use to neglect good Offers to come at Peace, if we may believe the Faction, who have for a long time pretended to fear nothing so much, as their quitting the Alliance for their own separate Interest. Tho' now the noble Firmness they have shewn in adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfaction of all Parties, is by these ill designing Politicians, who can take every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime; a Crime perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer; or if they are, 'tis not for want of some Mens taking the most effectual Methods to cure them of a Fault, which I don't remember they were ever before blam'd for.

That this is the whole Truth of this Matter, that these and no other, were the Offers the *French* made after the *Ramillies* Campaign; I will give you, besides those already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thousand Demonstrations, and that is a Letter of the *French* King to the Pope, on this Subject, writ in the following Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an end, and a new Campaign was entering upon.

This Letter may be found in the *Mercurie Historique & Politique*, Tom. 43. pag. 33. and here follows a Translation of it.

## LETTER of the King of *France* to the Pope.

Dated at *Versailles*, 15 Feb. 1707.

THE Care which your Holiness continues to take for procuring the Peace of Europe, is always equally agreeable to us. We have nothing more at Heart than to second  
your

your Endeavours, and we wou'd even prevent you in any thing we cou'd do to make them effectual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, so we shall seek Occasion to end it, by the most ready and easy Methods. Your Holiness has been inform'd, that we have already made frequent Advances to come to so wholesome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that Catholick Princes, struck with a Fear of displeasing their Allies, shou'd yet refuse to hear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. When we left it to the Arbitration of your Holiness to satisfy the Rights and Demands of the Emperor, by a valuable Compensation, upon some parts of the Spanish Monarchy: The Ministry of your Holiness were charg'd with the Care of making the Proposal of it to that Prince. But with what Haughtiness did he reject it! Having said Things exorbitant, and insolently demanded that our Grandson should be recall'd. Who cou'd have thought, most holy Father, that he wou'd have made so arrogant a Return to an Insulted King, to a Minister of your Holiness, and to our Love of Peace? For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable to the House of Austria, seem'd then to threaten it, by the Superiority of our Forces, and by our gaining the Battle of Cassano. But God, who is the Master of Events, chang'd the Posture of our Affairs. Yet tho' we were employ'd with the Cares of repairing our Losses, we had still in our Minds the Idea we had conceiv'd of Peace, at the time even of our greatest Prosperity. We renew'd to Holland the Offer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Security demanded for their Trade; reserving it still to our selves to treat with the Emperor about a Compensation. Propositions so reasonable were again rejected by the Intrigues of that Party, which had shew'd it self averse to the Advancement of our Grandson: And then we employ'd all our Thoughts to increase our Preparations for a War, which had been violently and unjustly declar'd against us.

Nevertheless as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious Exhortations of your Holiness: And to the End that our Enemies may have no pretence to impute to us the Loss of so much Christian Blood, as is already spilt, and now going

to be let out, we will give your Holiness a plain and frank Account of the Disposition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holiness, that the King our Grandson has intrusted us with full Power to convey the Arch-Duke a Part of those Estates that compose the Spanish Monarchy. The Catholick King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards, and is content to reign over them.

It only depends therefore on the Emperor to explain himself at this time, who may have, if he pleases, for ever reunited to his Family, The Milanese, Naples, and Sicily, with the other Islands belonging to Spain, that are situate in the Mediterranean Sea.

We should easily agree about a Barrier for the Republick of the united Provinces: And the Two pretences for the War, being thus remov'd, it wou'd not be difficult to put an End to those Misfortunes, which Europe has been so long oppress'd with.

We pray God that he will preserve your Holiness a great many Years in the Government of his Church.

Your Devout Son,

the King of France  
and Navarre,

S. Louis.

I shall leave it to your self to make the Reflections which naturally arise from this Letter; and having thus plainly shewn you how groundless the first Complaint of the Writers is, I shall endeavour to prove to you with the same Clearness, that there is as little Ground for the next, which is this:

2. That the War in Spain has been shamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entring into the War.

This is the most plausible of all their Complaints, and yet I doubt not but I shall easily convince you, that it has, if possible, less Sense in it than any of the rest. We  
that

that live at home have for the most Part, no other Way to judge of Affairs abroad, but by Events; and things having succeeded but ill on the Side of Spain, or at least very short of the Expectations we were fill'd with, that a Revolution there might be compass'd with as little Trouble as it was here, we readily give into any insinuations or Surmises, be they never so groundless or extravagant, that impute the Event we did not expect, to ill Conduct or Mismanagement; 'tis the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be knowing, or judging at least, whether they know or not, which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reason, to account for things, especially when they don't go to their Mind; they take for granted, wherever there is want of Success, there is a Fault; and 'tis some Amends they fancy for a Disappointment, if they can lay the Blame somewhere, no matter where: 'Tis this Humour makes this Complaint so popular; and when the Faction has given out that the War in Spain has been neglected, 'tis easily believ'd by those that know no better: but a very little Examination will clear up this Matter to the meanest Understanding.

This Complaint must mean one of these two Things, either that the Parliament has not been mov'd to make sufficient Provision for the War in Spain, or that the Provision made by Parliament has been misapply'd and that either here at home, or by those who have commanded the Forces that have been sent thither. If the Parliament was not moved to make sufficient Provision for the War in Spain, or there was any Neglect here at home, it will concern those whom this Complaint comes from, to shew they had no Part in the Management they now complain of, or else they will come themselves into some Part of the blame; unless it can be prov'd that they made proper Remonstrances against the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the neglect was not here but in Spain, if they misapply'd the Money, and return'd false Musters, or did not manage the Troops they had to the best Advantage, let those

who were entrusted with the Command there look to that. 'Tis a pretty great Presumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at home, that they who in that Case had most Reason to complain, have been so silent, tho' it so highly concern'd them, for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill Successes from themselves: But to come a little to Particulars. This Complaint is dated with one Consent from the Battle of *Almanza*, and yet, in all Reason, they ought to have look'd back at least one Year further: For 'tis yet a Secret how the mighty Advantage we had over the Enemy upon raising the Siege of *Barcelona* came to end as it did, when we had so fair a Prospect of making an entire Conquest of the whole Kingdom: why don't they ask, What was the true Reason that oblig'd *K. Charles* to lose six Weeks at *Barcelona*, when he should have been hastening to *Madrid*? Why my Lord *G.* and the Portuguese General, who lay so long in the Neighbourhood of *Madrid*, could have no Intelligence from those who commanded in *Catalonia*? Why, when King *Charles* did at last march to join the Portuguese, his Orders were not obey'd, when he desir'd that all the Troops that could be drawn together should be sent to reinforce those he had with him, which might have enabled him to give the French a Battle, and have ended the War on that side at once? And as to the whole Conduct of the War in *Catalonia*, to the End of that Year, why don't they ask, What Care was taken in transmitting Muster-Rolls, and what became of the Money issued for that Service? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay some not five Men in them; which made the Spanish Service so beneficial to the Officers, that they return'd home full of Money, a Thing very uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among the inferiour Officers in the Flanders-Army, 'tis not easie by all I have ever heard, to find a single Instance? One would think when so much Complaint is made upon this Subject, these were proper Points to be enquir'd into, which, as great a

Secret

Secret as they are at present, may one Day be laid open, so as every body may be able to see what Neglect there has been and whose Door it lies at: But to come to the Battle of Almanza, from which their Complaints are dated, what occasion'd the Loss of that Battle, or which comes to the same thing, what gave the French that great Superiority of Troops, I have told you before, it was the Reinforcement which the French, by the Evacuation of the Milanese, were at Liberty to send from Italy to Spain, a Thing which in England we did not know till it was too late to fence against it. What Pains had been taken here at home, to enable K. Charles to recover the Ground he had lost, upon his Retreat from Madrid, has been so well shewn in an Answer I have read to that Part of Faults on Both Sides which relates to this Matter, that I shall beg Leave to refer you to it.

As to the general Scheme of the War on that Side, and the Provision made for it, let those who clamour upon this Head shew us that they disapprov'd it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think for once there is some Sincerity in what they say; but till then I shall take leave to suspect all they say on this Head is only an Invention to infuse groundless Prejudices into the People against their best Friends. And for my own part, I am fully perswaded that these Writers, or those at least whose Tools they are, have been long convinc'd, from all the Experience we have had of the Spanish War, and particularly from the Battle of Almanza, and what follow'd upon it, that the best thing for England, is to draw the War on that Side into the least Compass we conveniently can, and keep on the Defensive only, contenting our selves with maintaining the Footing we had got, without pretending to more than to be in a Readiness to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Action, which either the Weakness or Negligence, or ill Conduct of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might be invited to by the Encouragement given us by those that are in the Austrian Interest. This I dare say, those Gentlemen think is the true Fact we should

put the Spanish War upon: and that it should be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our pay, and not employing our own Men, which can't be done without the greatest Inconveniencies; besides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, be much more usefully employed nearer home; and therefore I can think nothing to be farther from these Men's Thoughts than what is so much in their Mouths, that this War has been neglected, and that greater Provision ought to have been made for it: My Reason why I think them so insincere, is plainly this: that they can't but know the great Difference there is between an Offensive and Defensive War, and that what they seem to contend for is impracticable, and the most effectual Way we can take, never to have what these Writers and their Friends pretend to be so mightily concern'd for; 'Tis so evident to all that know any thing of these Matters, upon how unequal a foot the French and we must make an Offensive War in that Country; But nothing can make this so plain as to put a Case to you.

Suppose then, to humour these Men, we were to send from hence an Augmentation of 20000 Men, or for our own Share 10000, to Catalonia; shall we not then have 10000 less in Flanders, and may not the French lessen their Army there by the same Number? Suppose then the French and we both wou'd send an Augmentation of 10000 Men thither, let us see what will be the Consequence: The Men we send will be transported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Guess when they will come thither, and consequently can be sure of nothing, that depends upon their Arrival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark; and when Deductions are made for Sickness and Desertion, while they lie at Portsmouth, waiting for Ships and Winds; and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in so long a passage, especially if any malignant Distemper get among them, when we consider how unable these Men will be for Service, upon landing after so long a Voyage, which will make it absolutely necessary for them to go into Quarters of Refreshments before they take the Field; the Change they have of arriving at the most unwholesome Season of the Year; the Difference of that Climate from

from our own in all Seasons, the Numbers that will be swept away by drinking immoderately the strong Spanish Wine, which is impossible to keep Men from, when they are easy to be come at, and the intemperate eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army; the many Men that will be lost by mording in a strange Country, before they know where they are; a Word Soldiers are well acquainted with, and by which an Army loses more Men than can be easily imagin'd by those who are Strangers to these Matters; when all these things are consider'd, after so much Expence and Time, I believe, our 10000 at the End of two Months; after their Arrival, will, upon a modest Computation, be found not to exceed 4000 Effective. Let us now see what will become of those Men France sends: They may be sent from Dauphine and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be supply'd from the Rhine, and theirs again from Flanders: They may be sent at the most proper Season of the Year; their March may be made in a Month or six Weeks; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all things may be concerted against the Time they shall be fit to enter upon Action. Their Transportation costs nothing; and when they arrive, they are what they set out 10000 Men; and the Wine, and Fruits, and Climate, are so little different from their own, that it is very little they suffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quarter from the Peasants of the Country, than Hereticks can hope for, which makes no inconsiderable Difference: So that to France 'tis in a manner the same thing in all Respects to send Men to Spain as 'tis to Flanders; but to us, 'tis not only a vast Expence, but almost all to no Purpose.

But this is not all; I would ask these Gentlemen, how these Troops when they come to Spain shall subsist; how they shall get Horses, or find Forage, or be provided with sufficient Magazines? They that know any thing of Spain, can tell them, (but I know they don't want to be told) that the Country is not able to subsist its own Inhabitants, much less an Army of Foreign Troops, those Parts especially that are in our Hands: And I have heard that one great Reason for venturing the Battle of Almariza was, that as few Troops as 'twas said we had

bad there, they were too many to subsist, and that they must have starv'd if they had not fought. Now if the Country won't furnish Necessaries, whence are they to be fetch'd? Why, either from England or Italy; except some small matter that may be had from the Coasts of Africk. And is not this a pretty Method to subsist an Army? Ask those who know any thing of our Flanders-Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 100 Leagues from them? Ask them; what Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad Weather has spoil'd the Roads, tho' their Magazines be but four or five Leagues from them? Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis for them, when they can't be supply'd by Water with the things they want, tho' Flanders be the finest Country in the World to subsist an Army in, 'tis so fruitful in Corn, so full of good Towns, and affords so great a quantity of Wheel-Carriage. Ask but these Questions, and you will be presently convinc'd, how difficult it must be to subsist an Army in Catalonia, when a great part of their Subsistence must be brought by Sea, and from Places so remote; and the little the Country itself affords, must be fetch'd oftentimes a great way, and over such Mountains, as no Carriages can pass; all must be brought by Mules, which cost a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in such Numbers, as a very moderate Army has occasion for. In short, to subsist any Army in this Country is very difficult; they must often be in great danger of starving, while they depend on Winds and Seas for their Provisions; and to subsist a great one, which these Gentlemen would seem to argue for, is absolutely impossible.

Let us now see how it stands with France in this Point: Even as well as they can wish; for 'tis a very short Passage from Marseilles and Toulon to Roses and other Ports on that side of Spain, and the Provinces of France that lye nearest to their own Ports, are extremely fruitful, so that Magazines may be erected in them with all the ease imaginable; and when the Winds won't let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Reserve in Case of Necessity, and can supply their Troops by Land, Such a prodigi-

our Advantage has France over us in making War on that side, even upon Supposition of maintaining but a moderate Army there, that shall act offensively, and be to make great Marches in so barren a Country; and if we would send a great one thither, (not that I think any Army could be very great by the Time it was there) these Inconveniencies would encrease in a double Proportion at least; that is, sending twice the Number would be attended with four times the Disadvantages, thrice the Number with six times, and so on; but this is so plain, that I can't think it needs any farther Illustration; Need I add, how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service, which one may be sure finds no Volunteers; and those the Law would give to it, will of two Evils be glad to choose the least, and to prevent being sent to Spain, will List themselves in any other Service.

Besides, when these Recruits are rais'd, how shall they be sent? In small Numbers by the Packet-boats? But how often are they taken? And when they come to Lisbon, how shall they get on to Catalonia? And if they are kept till they can have the Opportunity of a Convoy, how long will they be wanted, and how insensibly will they moulder away, while they lie expecting the Time they so little wish for? And is not this a blessed Place to push the War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor subsisted, nor recruited, without the utmost Difficulties, the greatest Hazards, and perpetual Disappointments? I know but one sure Effect of such a War, & that is, that were it constantly fed, it would soon eat up all our Men: For every twenty effective Men in Spain, England loses at least threescore: And our Treasure flu'd for that Service, we shall have reason to think, sinks in the same Proportion as our Men do, if we consider the Expences of Transportation, and of Supplies sent from hence, the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Privateers, the Exchange of Money between England and Genoa, the excessive Price which Things will cost that are bought there for Catalonia by the time they get thither, the Charge we are at to get Horses for our Cavalry, which one with another,

cost

cost as much as five sent to *Flanders*. A slight View of these and the other necessary Articles; besides the standing vast Expence of maintaining so great a Part of our Fleet in the Mediterranean, will easily shew you, that to extend this War would serve to little else but to exhaust us of our Money, as well as Men. In short, both Men and Money shrink almost to nothing, when they come thither, in comparison of what they were when they went from us: From all which I can't but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonsense, or rather greater Villany, than what these Writers, or those that direct them, tell us upon this Head: For they know all this to be true, that there is no Pretence for the Complaints they make of the War on this side having been neglected, but that on the contrary, nothing can be so ruinous to *England*, as the Measures they would hurry us into. We can't have a better View, with what a Disadvantage we make an Offensive War in *Spain*, than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greatest Advantages are lost, thro' the utter Inability we are in to support them; for we can neither send them timely Help, nor so much as know what it is they want. Which by the way is another Circumstance, that ought to cure us of our Fondness for this War. The *French King* can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks; and that regularly; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at present sensible of: The Impatience we have for these four Months and more been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every body feel the want we have of Intelligence from those Parts; we know nothing but what the *French* are pleas'd to tell us, who won't lose, we may be sure, the Opportunity to impose upon us what they think, most for their Purpose, which makes it impossible, even for the New M— to take the proper Measures to support our Troops, tho' could we have known as much and as early as we would, all Relief from hence must have come too late to enable

enable our Men to keep the Ground they had with so much Glory gain'd; and thus it must always be, unless we would foresee, some Time before, when a Battle will be lost or won, and provide accordingly; otherwise every thing must come out of Time; while the *French*, in the mean while, have it in their power to shape their Measures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require; of which we have seen a melancholly Instance in the Support they have given the D. of *Anjou*, when his Affairs seem'd to be desperate and past Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the means to support him always near, and can concert things with that Exactness, as to make them all bear to a Point; whereas we can neither know nor do what we would; and the Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impossible to depend on them, or to concert any Measures against such or such a Time, if they must wait the Arrival of Succours or Supplies from *England* for their Execution. In a word, all things conspire to make *Spain* at the least desirible of all Places to push the War in; and one ought rather to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there so well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what Neglects to account for it: The thing is so plain, it speaks it self; the *Dutch* are so convinc'd of it, that they have never, for these three Years past, been prevail'd with to send any fresh Troops thither; *England* only is to be perswaded into these wise Measures, as if we could not be ruin'd fast enough.

If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any thing I have said on this Head, I will put you into a Way how you may easily inform your self: Get a Sight of the Accounts of the several Embarkations that have been made for *Spain*, both before and since the Battle of *Almanza*, and observe the Distance of Time between the Encampments of the Troops to go on board, and their taking the Field in *Catalonia*: Inquire into the Numbers the Regiments consisted of when they march'd for these Encampments, and how strong they were when

they join'd our Army: Ask some of the Officers of the six Regiments that were broke into others, a little before the Battle of Almanza, how many private Men they left when they came away, and some of them will tell you that their Regiments had not above 50 Men in them, and some not so many. I can't suppose you will pretend these Inconveniencies arise from any Neglect in the Admiralty, because that is no Part of the Complaint these Gentlemen make, and you know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the same Hands which we are at present so much pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of enlarging the Scheme of the War in Spain, to nothing but to Shakespear's strange Alacrity in Sinking; for sink we shall, and that very fast, if the Advice of these Writers be pursu'd.

But if this be the Case, you will say, Why then did we at first begin a War in Catalonia, or have not long since quitted it? This admits of a very easie Answer, if we look back into the Posture of Affairs at that Time and consider what it was we propos'd by making War on that Side, and what were the true Reasons that engag'd us in it: Such an Enquiry will shew you it was begun with the most promising Appearances in Favour of it, could we but succeed in the first Step; and tho' they have not answer'd our Expectations, yet when so good Footing was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces which began that War were first embark'd, 'twas very difficult to determine at this distance, which was most for the Service of King Charles and the Common Cause, to land in Catalonia, or attempt to give some Relief to the Duke of Savoy, which he was at that time in the greatest Want of; the Decision of this was left to the two Kings of Portugal and Spain, and their Ministers, who were best able to judge what Part was best to take; and after the Matter had been thoroughly consider'd, 'twas resolv'd for Catalonia, upon the pressing Instances of King Charles, and the many and repeated Assurances that

that had been given him of the good Dispositions of the Spaniards to declare for him, as soon as he should have any firm Footing in Spain, and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer Spain, or to force a Revolt upon them, but to favour one, supposing them inclin'd to it; and what made the Experiment the more worth trying, was the desperate Condition of Affairs in Italy, which this was thought the likeliest Way to give some Relief to, by obliging the French to take off a Part of that weight of Troops with which the Duke of Savoy was so violently press'd: Besides, you may remember that at the Time this War in Catalonia was begun, we had not the least Prospect of making such mighty Conquests in Flanders, which was every Inch of it in the French Hands; and 'twas more than any body cou'd tell, when it wou'd be otherwise, much less cou'd they hope to see any possibility of Penetrating into France on that side, which we have had since the Ramellies Campaign so fair a Prospect of. These Circumstances of Affairs, the Appearance there was of losing all in Italy, and of getting nothing in Flanders, made it very reasonable for us to try the Inclinations of the Spaniards, and had they answer'd better the Assurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for once been carry'd thither, had doubtless been very well employ'd, to give them Countenance.

These were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that side, and nothing but Experience could have convinc'd People, that Spain might not have been had for going for; especially when those who were presum'd to be the best Judges, were so sure of the Success, so that nothing could have justify'd our not making the Tryal; whatever had been said against it, would not have been believ'd, while the Inconveniences of this War had not yet been felt, and for that Reason could not be so certainly judg'd of.

These were great Inducements to try what might be done there; and the first Attempt met with Success; for the Enemy not being prepar'd for us, and the People on that side being

being pretty much in our Interest. Barcelona soon fell into our Hands, and all Catalonia with it; and we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one, unless they had been more dispos'd to it themselves: In which Point no body wants to be told, they fail'd. But tho' this Consequence, which we hop'd for from our Success, did not follow from it, the Advantage we had gain'd was too considerable to be parted with; for by being Masters of Barcelona, we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were by the Situation of ours, oblig'd to lessen considerably their Army on the side of Portugal, which one might have expected would have turn'd to a better Account than it did, and wou'd have enabl'd the Portuguese to have made some Impression on Spain. But that is not all, as long as we had such a Footing, and the Enemy could not depend on the Inclinations of the People to the Duke of Anjou, which by what they had seen in Catalonia, they had reason to be very apprehensive of, they were forc'd to employ an Army, much superiour to ours, to observe our Motions, not knowing to which side we might turn our selves, or where an Insurrection might break out in favour of us. And besides the Distraction, Uncasiness, and great Expence this new War created the Duke of Anjou, and his Adherents, it oblig'd him to discover his Distrust of the Spaniards more than he had done before; and to shew he thought himself safe only in French Armies, as well as French Councils, which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, tho' not so much as might have been hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation. These, you will allow were no slight Reasons for maintaining the Footing we had in Catalonia; much more will you think so, when you reflect, that this little Piece of Spain had four Tears ago let us into a full Possession of the Whole, had not a most fatal and unaccountable Mismanagement ruin'd all; nor to insist on several other good Effects; such as keeping his Moliness, and the other Italian Princes in awe, who discover'd but too much Inclination to a League with France, the alarming of the Southren Coast of France, and giving Encouragement to the Sevennois, and other New Converts, who had long

shewn they would stir if they could : which created a fresh  
 Trouble and Expence to the French King, by obliging him to  
 keep Troops on that side, to no other end, but to observe the  
 motions of his own Subjects ; and in the last place, had it suc-  
 ceeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the Whole of the Grand Pro-  
 ject against Toulon. These are such Advantages of the Spanish  
 War as will sufficiently justify the begining and pursuing  
 of it in the manner we have done, especially since the Reducti-  
 on of Minorca has made it so safe and easy to keep a good  
 Squadron all the Year in the Mediterranean. But these  
 Purposes are all answer'd, while we confine that War with-  
 in moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the Defensive on-  
 ly. There is no need of enlarging the Scheme of the War,  
 which instead of doing Service to the Common Cause, would  
 make us lose several of the Advantages we have by it, while  
 it lies in a narrow Compass, and would endanger what we  
 might maintain, while we extend our selves beyond our  
 Strength, and grasp at more than we can hold ; besides the  
 other great Inconveniences, which I have shewn you, must  
 follow the making an Offensive War on this side, which  
 can never possibly succeed, unless the Castilians were more  
 our Friends, or more were to be expected from the Portu-  
 guese. And even a Defensive War, Experience has shewn us, is  
 much better carry'd on by Foreign Troops, which not only  
 spares our Men, but saves a great deal of Money, and is  
 much more convenient for the Service, the Passage be-  
 ing so much shorter from Italy than it is from England. And  
 yet we all see that notwithstanding the Endeavours to support  
 King Charles upon his late Victories, no Reinforcement has  
 yet been sent him, even from thence, as feasible as it seems,  
 and as great Occasion as he has for them ; and the Reinforce-  
 ment that was last sent, 'tis known did not arrive till the  
 middle of June, tho' it was intended and order'd, that they  
 should be there in January. Thus difficult it has been to main-  
 tain this War on the Foot it has been hitherto upon ; and from  
 Experience we may be sure, that it will be, and worse,  
 proportionably worse, as we enlarge it. And therefore I  
 can't think, any body does in earnest mean more, than to do  
 what we design, without loss of time, but not to design  
 more

more than is absolutely necessary, or to extend the Compass of the War.

But they tell us, there is a Necessity for it, and that Spain is not otherwise to be had: But why so? Have they never heard in Physick of such a Term, as Revolution, which teaches to remove the Evil from one part by proper Applications, not to the Part it self, but to its Opposite? Or have they not so much Mechanicks, as Children can teach them, who if they would throw down *B*, which is at the Top of *A*, and out of their Reach, will presently try if they can't pull down *A*. They know almost by Instinct, that 'tis all one whether you pull down *B* directly, or that which supports it. And 'tis the same thing with Spain; if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it must be by proper Applications to France. France, all the World sees, is the Support of the Duke of Anjou, and if this Support be forc'd from him, he will as surely tumble, as if you could pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has usurp'd. Since therefore we can't reach him, we should set our selves with all our Might to pull from him his Support, and then he must fall on course: How near we have been succeeding in this, you can't want to be told. And how it came not to be quite done, your Friends know without being told; and how much soever they may like the Reason of this, I'm perswaded they don't much like to hear of it. And if Spain be not gain'd this way, one may without the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will be gain'd at all.

Read now again these admir'd Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amus'd you, and you begin to think there is something in them, then turn to this true State of the Case, and the Mist they have cast before you will vanish; their Harangues will leave no more Impression upon you, than the famous Doctor's Speech does upon those that look into his Sermon. But instead of those Impressions, I cannot but think there will remain upon your Mind, as there does on mine, an utter Detestation and Abhorrence of the black Villany

any and Malice some Men have us'd to ruin the Reputation of the ablest and most faithful Ministers, and to hazard every thing that is dear to us as *Englishmen* and Protestants, rather than not compass their own destructive Ends.

I remember, I have often thought, upon the late intended Invasion of the Pretender, that it was on his part a very foolish Enterprize; for tho' it might answer the Purposes of *France*, and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And I am of the same Opinion with respect to our Domestick Invaders, if I may use that Expression; the Publick indeed may suffer by them, as much as *France* can wish, but if it should have the good Fortune to escape the Danger, it is threatned with; the Attempt that has been made upon it will, I am perswaded, sooner or later bring inevitable Ruin upon themselves.

But we are both, I dare say, sufficiently tir'd for one time; I shall therefore take leave of you for the present, with Assurances that you shall, in a very little time, hear again from,

S I R,


Your most faithful,

Humble Servant

Post-

*Postscript.*

**S**ince these Papers were in the Press, the ill News is come of a Battle lost in Spain after the Glorious Actions of *Almanara* and *Saragossa*; Two Victories so great in themselves, and in the Consequence of them, that they might have been decisive of the War. if the *Portuguese* had join'd which I am very sorry they did not, for the sake of the common Cause, and even of the young General himself, so justly applauded for his fearless Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But tho' this unfortunate Battle has too much justify'd what I have said against enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country, I still hope we may be in a condition not much worse than last Year, and able to continue acting in the *Defensive* manner I have recommended.

 Note, That the Second Part is now in the Press, and will be Publish'd next Week.

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